ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

toward the defendant in a threatening manner," the degree of
force, whether it be reasonable or unreasonable, which defendant
might employ, would depend measurably upon the known character, in that respect, of the plaintiff; whether he be a "man of
war from his youth," or of peace; whether he had the temper, the
will and ability, to inflict sudden and great bodily injury, and the
danger was imminent, or whether he was known to the defendant
as a man of mild temper and a stranger to violence. We think
the evidence should have been received, and that the apparent
danger which threatened the defendant would be somewhat affected
by it, and the degree of force which defendant might lawfully use
should be measured or modified by it.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. 1
2
COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.3
COURT OF CHANCERY OF NEW JERSEY.4
SUPREME COURT OP NEW YORK.5
SUPREME COURT OF VERMONT. 6

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. Sce Contract.
Promissory Note-Tender.-Where the holder of a promissory note
surrenders it to the maker, and takes one of less amount in satisfaction,
it is a full discharge, and no action can be maintained for the unpaid
portion. The
surrender is equivalent to a release under seal: Draper
43 Vt.
v. Hitt,
A tender made subject to the condition that if the party take the
amount offered, it is to be in full payment of all his claims, is invalid: Id.
ACTION.

Declaration- Causes of Action-Insufficiency of Highway- Verdict.
-Where the subject-matter and causes of action are separate and divisible, and the declaration is single and in one count, the plaintiff cannot
I From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 7 Kansas Reports.
2 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 34 31d. Reports.
3 From the Judges; to appear in 49 N. H. Reports.

4 From C. E. Green, Esq.; to appear in vol. 7 of his Reports.
5 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in vol. 60 of his Reports.
6 From W. G. Veazey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in-43 Vt. Reports.
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duplicate the causes of action, and it would be error, after having given
evidence of one, to allow him to attempt to prove another: Iodge v.
Town of Bennzington, 43 Vt.
If two causes of action should become disclosed by the evidence, the
plaintiff should be required to elect for which he will claim a recovery:
In this case the axle was broken, the plaintiff thrown from the carriage, and the horse having thereby become startled, ran along the
insufficient road for some twenty rods, plunged into the ditch and was
killed. field, that this constitutes but one ground of action : Id.
The plaintiff claimed that the road was insufficient both where the
horse was killed and the axle was broken, and also claimed a recovery
by reason of the insufficiency at either or both said points, they both
being in the section of the highway alleged to have been insufficient in
the declaration, which contained but one count. Held, that it was not
error for the court to refuse to compel the plaintiff to elect for which
injury he would go to the jury: Id.
When the issues in a case are divisible and distinct, as when the
want of a stamp or seal and payment are separate issues, and the jury
find by their verdict the debt paid, evidence improperly admitted against
objection upon the other issue becomes immaterial and is no ground for
reversing the judgment: 17.
The jury in this case found that the horse was killed by reason of
the insufficiency of the highway where the axle was broken, and evidence of the insufficiency of the road where the horse was killed thereby
became immaterial, and, if improperly admitted against objection, would
be no ground for reversing the judgment: Id.
It is the duty of towns to build and repair their roads in such manner
that they will be reasonably safe from the consequences of such accidents as might'justly be expected occasionally to occur on such roads:
id.
The axle was nearly severed by an old crack, and unsafe for use upon
the road, but this was unknown to the plaintiff. The court instructed
the jury that it was the duty of the plaintiff to use such care about
the safety of the horse, the harness, and sufficiency of the wagon, and
the manner of driving, as reasonably prudent men commonly used about
their own affairs of like importance under like circumstances, and if the
plaintiff failed to use such care about the wagon, axle, or about anything
connected with the accident, and the want of such care in any degree
contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. field, that in this there
was no error: Md.
AGENT. See Railroad."
Ag/ency may be inferred.-Where the keeper of a boarding-house of
a railroad company had been in the habit of purchasing provisions from
the plaintiff, for the use of the boarding-house, and the bills for such
provisions had been, from time to time, paid byI the company, the plaintiff might properly regard him as an agent _pro tan to of the company,
and would be justified, in the absence of any notice to the contrary, in
dealing with him as such: P., W. and B. R. Co. v. Weaver, 34 Md.
ARBITRATION AND

AWARD.

Submission-Remedy for Breacl.-A submission to arbitrators is a

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

contract, implying an agreement of each party with the other, to abide
the result: Whitclier v. Whitcher, 49 N. H.
Where the submission is by parol, assumpsit is the appropriate form
of action in which to recover damages for the non-performance of the
award; whether the party be directed by the award to pay money or to
do any collateral act: Id.
Non assumpsit puts in issue every material averment, and even intrinsic defects in the award: Id.
An award may be good in part and bad in part; and the valid part
may be sustained and will support an action for breach of the promise
to perform the general award when, and only when, it clearly appears
that the void part is so disconnected from the valid part that it could
not have affected the decision of the arbitrators in other respects; so
that, the void part being rejected, the remaining parts will yet express
the judgment of the arbitrators truly: Id.
If that part which is void be so connected with the rest as to affect
the justice of the case between the parties., the whole is void : Id.
ASSISTANCE.
ATTORNEY.

See

Equit.y.

See .usband and Wife.

Estoppel- Costs.-Wheu a party employs an attorney in a cause he
has the right to his services about the litigation therein in his behalf,
and to confide to him all facts concerning the subject of litigation, with.out being exposed to having the facts used by the pefson employed in
any manner against his advantage: Davis v. Smith, 43 Vt.
An attorney employed in a cause, by purchasing the interest of the
adversary party, acquires no right as against his client that he can enforce
by judicial proceedings against him, and the client may treat the purchase as made for himself: Id.
While the orator was the defendant's solicitor and legal dviser in a
foreclosure suit in favor of the defendant against P. and in other liti.
gation upon the same subject-matter between them, the orator purchased
of P. his interest in the premises and then tendered the defendant the
amount due thereon under his sale to P. and his costs in the foreclosure
suit. The defendant declined to receive the same and claimed the
benefit of the purchase, offering to pay the orator what he paid P. The
orator then brought this suit in chancery praying for an order on the
defendant to convey said premises to the orator upon payment by him
of the amount tendered as aforesaid. .Teld, that the defendant Was
entitled to take the benefit of the orator's purchase by paying him the
amount that he paid, whether the orator made the purchase by instructions of the defendant to purchase for him or not, and although he
intended to purchase.for himself; and there being a question of rents
and profits of the premises while the orator was in possession, that could
be settled in this suit: Pi.
The fact that the orator before making the purchase, but while he
was the attorney of the defendant in his litigation with P., heard the
defendant say to P. that all he wanted was his money, would not estop
the defendant from claiming the benefit of the purchase, he not having
told the defendant that he proposed to make the purchase in reliance
upon that saying: Id.
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BAILMENT.

Diligence reguired of Gratuitous Bailees-Jleasure of Damages.A. deposited with IN. & Go., bankers, fbr safe-keeping, certain couponbonds of the United States, bearing interest, payable ifi gold, on the
1st of May and November, in each year. These bonds were subsequently abstracted from their custody. After their abstraction, a receipt
dated as of the day when the deposit was made, was given by the
bankers to A., in which they promised to return the bonds on demand,
or pay the full value thereof, including gold interest. The bonds were
never returned. In an action against the bankers, tried on the 5th of
April 1869, to recover the value of these bonds, it was Jfeld;
1st. That the plaintiff was entitled to recover, if the loss or abstraction of the bonds occurred through the failure' of the defendants to use
such care as persons of common prudence, in their situation and business, usually bestow in the custody and keeping of similar property
belonging to themselves.
2d. That the measure of damages was the value of the bonds at the
time demand was made for them, and the value of the gold interest
thereon, from the day when the same was payable, with interest on the
value of the several instalments of such gold interest, due semi-annually,
and interest on the principal sum from the lst of November 1868.
3d. That if the receipt did not express the terms of the deposit, but
it was a simple bailment of the bonds, to be safely kept without reward,
the plaintiff was entitled to recover, unless the! same care and diligence
were exercised by the defendants in their custody, and the measure of
damages would be the same: .Mau & Co. v. Coyle, 34 Md.
Bailee without Reward.-A banker receiving a package of money as a
special deposit without compensation, is bound only for slight care, and
responsible only for gross negligence: Hale et al. v. Rawallie, 7 Kans.
A mere showing to a depositor of the facilities and security of a bank,
is not such a representation as increases the obligation of the banker-in
the keeping of a deposit. Id.
BANKER.

See Bailment.

See Replevin.
Discharge-Judgment in rem-Trustee Process.-A discharge in
bankruptcy will not prevent a creditor of the bankrupt, who obtained a
lien upon a fund by trustee attachment more than four months prior to
the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, from taking a decree
in rein against the said fund: Stoddard v. Locke and others, 43 Vt.
BANKRUPTCY.

BILLS AND NOTES.

See Accord.

BOND.

Of Indemnity-.The obligee of a bond of indemnity has no cause
of action against the the obligor, which he can set up as a counter-claim
or set off in an action brought by the obligor against the obligee, unless
he has sustained some loss covered by the bond', or would sustain some
such loss by reason of a recovery against him in such action: Abeles v.
Cohen, 7 Kans.
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BROKER.

Commssons.-Where a broker is employed to procure a purchaser
for a house, and through his agency negotiations are begun, and a sale
is finally effected, he may recover his commissions from the party at
whose instance and request the services were rendered, whether he held
the legal title of the property benefieial&, or in trust for his wife: Jones
v. Adler, 34 Md.
Where by a special cbntract, a broker is not to be paid commissions.
unless he sells the property at a stipulated price, the sale by him at such
a price is a'condition precedent to his right to compensation, unless
pending the negotiations and whilst his agency remains unrevoked, the
owner consents to a sale at a different price: Id.
If a broker introduces the purchaser or discloses his name to the seller,
and through such introduction or disclosure negotiations are begun and
the sale of the property is effected, the broker is entitled to his commissions, although, inpoint of fact, the sale may have been made by the
owner: ]d.
Where property is sold at a particular price with the consent of the
owner, the broker who effected the sale is entitled to his commissions,
although he may not have been requested by the owner to sell at that
price, under an agreement to pay commissions: Id.
COLLATERAL SECURITY.

Liability vzodified by

See Guaranty.

COMMON CARRIER.

Secal (ontract-Presumption of Neyli-

gence.-B. entered into a contract with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company, for the transportation of certain live-stock over its road, and
in consideration of a reduction in the charge for freight, agreed to
"release the railroad company from any and all claims which might
arise for damage or injury to said stock, whilst in the cars of the company, or for delay in its carriage, or for escape thereof from the cars,
and generally from all claims relating thereto, except such as might
arise from the gross negligence or default of the agents or officers of
the company acting in the discharge of their several official duties."
In an action by B. against the railroad company to recover damages for
certain cattle, which were lost and injured in their transportation over
its road, it was ileld:
1st. That by the contract the burden was imposed on the plaintiff
of proving not merely that the live-stock was injured and damaged by
accident and delay occurring in their transportation, but also that these
ware caused by the gross negligence or default of the defendant's
agents.
2d. That the fact that some of the cattle were
injured and lost by
accidents 'on the railroad, while in the course of transportation, that
considerable delays occurred in their carriage, and that they were damaged and lessened in weight and value from this cause, does not raise
the presumption of negligence or delault on the parit of the agents of
the railroad company within the meaning of the contract: Bankard v.
B. and 0. Railroad Co., 34 Md.
lkading-Negligence-Variance.-Itis not unusual to insert in a
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declaration averments which affect only the rule of care and negligence
which should govern the case. Thus declarations alleging the defendants to be common carriers, and at the same' time averring gross negligence on their part in the transportation of the goods' are usual and
well approved. In such cases the failure to prove the allegation of
negligence is no variance, and the plaintiff may recover without such
proof, provided the evidence shows a case under the general rule
respecting the liability of carriers. On the other hand, if the plaintiff
does prove the allegation of negligence, he may recover, even though
there are circumstances limiting the responsibility of the carrier below
the common-law rule: Sargent v. Birchard& Page, 43 Vt.
Where the declaration averred that the plaintiff conveyed a strip of
land to the railroad company, describing it and setting forth the conditions in the deed, one of which was that the' plaintiff assumed no risk
of fires happening by reason of the railroad passing through said land,
and averring that the railroad company accepted the deed, and thereby
assumed responsibility for fires, and built andloperated the road, and by
carelessly managing their engines, &c., the plaintiff's timber land was
set on fire, &c., it was held suflicient on special demurrer: Id.
CONSPIRACY.

Gist of the Action-Special Damage sustained by the PlaintifConspiracy as matter of Aggravation-RWhen Case is not a proper
1Remedy.-In an action on the case against several, founded on an alleged
conspiracy to injure the plaintiffs, they are not entitled to recover, even if'
there were such unlawful conspiracy among the defendants, unless the
plaintiffs can show that they have in fact been aggrieved, or have sustained actual legal damage by some overt act, done in pursuance and
execution of the conspiracy: Kimball v. larman, 34 Md.
No action lies for simply conysiring to do an unlawful act; it is the
doing the act itself, and the resulting actual damage to the plaintiff which
furnish the ground of the action : Id.
An act which, if done by one alone, constitutes no ground of an
action on the case, cannot be made the ground Qf such action by alleging
it to have been done by and through a conspiracy of several. The
quality of the act, and the nature of the injury inflicted by it, must
determine the question whether the action will lie: Id.
The fact of conspiracy is matter of aggravation, and it only becomes
necessary, in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover in one action against
several, that the combination or conspiracy should be proved: Id.
I,, an action on the case against several, fbr an alleged conspiracy to
defeat the right of the plaintiffs to receive and -possess a certain lot of
bed-teads, which they had purchased of one of the defendants, the plaintiffs cannot recover damages against such defendant, for a breach of the
contract of sale to them: Pd.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

oustitlttinalitfl of the. Actis of Assembi! exacting for the use of the
Sttle one fi/h of the annou,,t received by the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Conpa.fron -passepgersoier its Washington Branch-Such
Exaction not a Cqpiation Tax-Riht of the State to recorerfrom the
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Railroadin an Actiox for Money -4adand recive.-Set-off as a Plea
to an Acliqn by the Slate.-The Acts of Assembly (1832, ch. 175,1886,
eh.-261i 1844, oh. 103, 1845, oh. 370, and 1852, oh. 328,) in so far as
Ahdy provide that the Baltibaore aid Ohio Railroad Company shall pay
Semi-annually to. the treasurer of The staf for its use, the one-fifthof
o'whQle amount tha iay be received Ay. the cowpany for the tramsletationi of psasengera Wver its road betw;een Washington and Baltimore,
tre .not in conflietwit.e :Constithtln of the United States: State of
Maryland v. B. and OJ.RR. (Jo., 34 Md.
The exaction by th .s.tate bf.the one.flft of the passenger fare collected by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company over the Washington
branch, is not a capitatiou. tax,:or in any proper sense a tax upon the
passenger for the right of transitib~ta tax imp.sed upon the corporation
with its consent, and therefore free fromall constitutional objection: 12.
. Even if the ode-fifth of.the passenger fare "aeured to the state under
she provisions of the Act of 1832,:eh. 175, anAl its supplements, were a
capitation tax unconstitutionally imposed.upon.psssengers for the right
of transit, the railroad company having collected the money in pursuance
of their pr6visions, could not bi allowed to retain it as against the claim
of thb state; and the bame may be recovered 'by the state in an action
of.-aumpsit for money had and received: -d.
A state -being sovereign is hbt 'liable to ib sued by an individual or
corp6.ratlon; the right therefore of set-off which is: in the nature of 4
';oss-suit, does not exist in actions institnted by the of et,except where
such defence is expressly allowed by statute: Id.
CONTRACT. See .Evidence.
Falie Warranty- Conditional Rale-Rescission.-The plaintiff and
defendant exchanged horses, the plaintiff letting the defendant have a
colt on which there existed an outstanding claim in favor of a conditional
vendor. The defendant was never damnified nor disturbed in his possession of the colt, and after this suit for false warranty was brought, and
before trial and before the defendant had ever interposed any objection
to the contract on account of this defect of title, the plaintiff paid up
said claim. Held, that this objection cannot avail the defendant as a
defeuce in this suit :Clayton v. Scott, 43 Vt. '
And in order to entitle the defendant to ihake it, if it were .a proper
defence, the defendant should have first offered to rescind: id.
Accord and Satisfaction.-After a simple contract is broken and
damage thereby accrued, it cannot be discharged by parol 'without
satisfaction or some consideration, though it may be before. But if the
new agreement is upon good consideration -and performed, it is a satisfaction and a defence, and 'it makes no'difference that the prior agreement
is in writing, and the new agreement verbal: Cutler v. Robbins, 43 Vt.
DAMAGES.
See Bailment.
Cjompcnsative and Exemplary- Control of the Court orer.-Where
there is neither fraud, malice, or gross negligence or oppression, damages
will be confined to compensation for the plaintiff's injury: Belknap v.
Boston & Maine Railroad,49 N. H.
In such eases the character, standing, condition, or circumstances of
the defendant are entirely immaterial: Rd.
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But where exemplary or punitory damages are to be given, the condition and circumstances of the defendant may be material. What
would be sufficient damages, by way of example and of punishment for
a day laborer without means, would be nothing either b ' way of punishment or of example in case of a wealthy corporation: Id.
Excessive damages are good ground for setting aside a verdict, where
from their exorbitancy, the court may reasonably presume that the jury
in assessing them were influenced by passion, partiality, prejudice, or
corruption :Pi.
So a verdict will be set aside when the damages are too small, as well
as when they are too large : Id.
Where the verdict is set aside on the ground of excessive damages,
the court, instead of simply ordering a new trial, will give the plaintiff
the option of reducing the verdict to the sum which the court considers
reasonable, and on his remitting the excess will give him judgment for
the residue, and will deny the motion for a new trial, and this in actions
of tort as well as upon contract: Id.
See .Husband and Wife.
.FraudulentConvellancebj Debtor-HusbandandWMf-Wherea debtor
has transferred his property to his wife, who 'holds it for his use, and
permits him to control and enjoy it, and he thereby defies and defrauds
his creditors, it will not protect him in a court of equity, that the forms
of law have been pursued: AMetropolitan Bank v. Durant and others, 7
C. E. Green.
No payment of consideration will protect any sale contrived and accomplislied to defraud creditors when the purchaser has knowledge of
the object of the sale: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

DEED.

See Equitt/.
ENTRY.

Disclainer)-Amendmentof.-In a writ of entry, if the tenant disclaims
a part or all of the land demanded, he is held thereby to admit the
demandant's title to the land disclaimed and is estopped afterwards to
deny it. But such admission and estoppel is not rendered final and
absolutely conclusive until after judgment: Wells v. Jackson Iron
.Manufacturing Co., 49 N. H.
Therefore, in such case, if the tenant disclaims a part of the land
demanded, and pleads the general issue as to the 'residue, and the plaintiff
accepts the disclaimer and joins the issue, the tenant mayatany timebefore
judgment, for cause shown, have leave to amend-his disclaimer, so as to
cover a greater or less amount of land than that originally disclaimed:
id.
EQUITY. See Debtor and Creditor.
ILiunction-Settlement of Rihts at Law prior to.-To entitle a party
to a preliminary injunction his right in the subject matter in dispute,
and to the remedy applied for, must be clear to the court and free from
reasonable or serious doubt, or established by proceedings at law: 11ackensark Improvement Commnission v. New Jersey .MidlandRR. Co., 7 C
E. Green.
If the facts upon which the right depends are established or admitted,
and the principles of law which on those facts would give the right,
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are settled and established in this state, it is not always necessary that
the claim of the complainant should have been established in a suit at
law. The chancellor may in such case apply the principles as settled by
the courts of law, to the facts, and allow the injunction: Id.
But when the principles of law on which the right rests are disputed,
and will admit of doubt, a court of equity, although satisfied as to what
is the correct conclusion of law upon the facts, may not, upon the opinion of the equity judge, without a decision of the courts at law establishing such principles, grant the injunction : Id.
An injunction must not issue, where the benefit secured by it is of
little importance, while it will operate oppressively and to the great annoyance and injury of the defendant, unless the wrong complained of is
wanton and unprovoked : - .
The right of the complainants to an injunction depending upon the construction of conflicting provisions in a statute, and the construction of
such provisions never having been* settled by the courts of law, this
court cannot interfere : Id.
Correction of ,istakes in Deeds and Records.-To correct deeds for
fraud or mistake in them is one of the ancient and well established
heads of equity jurisdiction, and it is the duty of the court where such
fraud or mistake is clearly proved, to correct it by any means in its
power to effect the amendment and the object of it: Loss v. Obrj, 7
C. E. Green.
,Mistakes are corrected even where they occur in the records or proceeding.s of courts, and exist in the records themselves. This is done
not by reviewing the judgments or proceedings of the courts, but by
restraining the parties who may take advantage of such mistakes from
doing so, or by compelling the i to execute proper papers for the purpose
of such correction: Id.
.Msrepresentaton-Deed-,.pecficPeiformance.-A representation
that a public alley over part of the premises is only a private right of
way in a few persons when made by mistake, and when the rights in the
property are substantially the same in either case, is not such a misrepresentation as will bar specific performance: Wuestluffv. Seymour, 7
0. E. Green.
A conveyance of lands described by courses with the addition of
the words "being the same premises conveyed to K. the grantor, by
H. by deed dated," &c., will convey the whole premises in that deed,
although the description leaves out a small strip, such being the evident
intention of the parties: Id.
,.pec.fic Performance.-Specificperformance will notbe enforced where
the contract does not designate with certainty the lands to be conveyed:
Carr v. .PassaicLand Improvement Co., 7 0. E. Green.
A resolution "that two acres be sold," is vague and uncertain upon
its face. The uncertainty is patent, and parol proof is inadmissible to
explain it: Id.
Writ qf Assistance.-The writ of assistance can only issue against
persons who are parties to the suit, or who came into possession under a
defendant after its commencement. But in all cases the parties in possession and against whom the writ is applied for, should have notice of
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the application and are entitled to be heard on it: Blauvcit v. ,Smiti,
7 C. E. Green.
This writ is a summary process, only used when the right is clear,
and when there is no equity or appearance of equity in the defendant,
and where the sale and proceedings under the decree are beyond suspicion : !t.
J'ractice-Pqjmentof Money into Court.-Money will not be ordered
to be paid into court, which is not asertained to be due by an account
or decree in the cause, or admitted to be due by the answer or other
proceedings in the cause, a parol admission proved by affidavit is not
sufficient: MlfcTighe v. Dean, 7 0. E. Green.
ESTOPPEL.
Contract- Constuction-Acts in pais.-When the lessee of property
agrees to pay all .assessments that may be made thereon, be in fact agrees
to pay such assessments only as are valid, or such as can be legally
enforced against the lessor, or against the property: Clark v. Coolidge,
7 Kans.
When an assessment which is void has been made against the property,
and the lessor comes to the lessee and tells him the amount thereof, and
also asks why the lessee does not pay the same, and the lessee says it is
all right, and he will pay the same, but does not do so, and afterward6
the lessor pays it, and then brings suit against the lessee to recover from
him the amount thereof, the lessee is not estopped from showing that
the assessment is void: Id.
It is a general rule of both law and equity, that a party may always
plead, prove and rely upon the truth of any transaction, in the determination of his rights, unless lie would be.committing a fraud upon the
rights of the adverse party by doing so: Id.
Estoppels in paiv, as a general rule, can apply only where the party
doinig the act or making the admission knows- the truth of the matter
connected therewith, or pretends to know it, or has better means of
knowing it than the adverse party; where the adverse party does not
know i.; where the act or admission is expressly designed to influence
the conduct of the adverse party; and where the adverse party relies
upon and is influenced by such act or admission: Id.
EVIDENCE.

See

lusband and V;fe.

Ofa Con 'ersatonmerged in a Contract.-Evidence of a conversation
between the parties at the time the defendants delivered to the plaintiff
a writing claimed to be a contract, was objected to, on the ground that
what wa said, at the time, was merged in the written contract, field
that as the plaintiff was proceeding on the theory that the writing was
not the agreement, and that the conversation proved it was not, the
evidence was admissible for that purpose: Hoag v. Owen, 60 Barb.
Declarathnsof Parties.-Underthe Act of 1864, eh. 109, making
parties 1o suits competent witnesses, a party cannot offer in evidence his
own declarations in his own behalf, in relation to the subject of controver.-y, or iiatter in issue. The act does not change any of the.rules
relating to the admissibility of evidence: Friendet al. v. lmill, 34 Md.
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FIXTURE.

See Mortgage.

GUARANTY.

Extension of TIme of Payment of a Bond- CollateralSecurity.-An
extension of the time of payment of a bond, given by the holder thereof
to the principal obligor, does not operate to discharge a guarantor of
such bond, if the agreement for the extension were entered into after
the maturity of the bond: Hays v. Wells, 34 Md.
An agreement, which will operate to discharge a surety in a bond, or
a guarantor of its payment, must be an actual agreement between the
creditor and the principal to extend the time of payment, and it must
be upon sufficient consideration, and must amount in law to an estoppel
upon the creditor sufficient to prevent him from bringing a suit before
the expiration of the extended time; when such an agreement is made,
the surety is discharged: Id.
The agreement for extension must not only be valid and binding in
law, but the time of the extension must be definitely and precisely.
fixed: Id.
The possession of an additional or collateral security, does not impair
the right of a creditor to enforce payment of the obligation, to secure
which the collateral was given and accepted, so long as it does not
appear that the debt has been paid: Ia.
An agreement to extend the time of payment of a bond will not be
inferred from the acceptance by the holder, of a collateral security
Which did not mature until after the maturity of the bond: Id.
HIGHWAYS. See Action ; Nuisance.
.nsufficiency.--A person must be in the use of a highwayfor tlhepurpose of travel in order to be entitled to recover damages on account of
its insufficiency: Sykes v. Town of Pawlet, 43 Vt.
A party having voluntarily and for his own convenience deviated from
a highway which in its travelled track was in good condition, and having
met with an accident causing damages to him by backing his horse over
a bank outside of the highway, but which extended up to the travelled
track so as to make the highway itself dangerous and insufficient outside
of the travelled track, is not entitled to recover against the town for the
injury: Id.
The plaintiff left the highway, which in its travelled track was in
good condition, to drive into a private shed outside of the highway, for
the purpose of leaving his team there while attending to some business
in the village. In getting out of the shed he backed over a bank
extending from the shed to the travelled track of the highway, and having no muniments on the margin. The phice of the accident was uutside of the highway. .eld. that the plaintiff could not recover against
the town for the injury: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See Deltor and Creditor.

Liability of Husbaudfor Services to Fife.-A husband is not liable
to an attorney for professional services rendered hii wife, in defending
a libel for divorce by the husband against her upon the ground of her
adultery, even though such defence may prove successful: lay v.
Addin, 49 N. H.
WVife's Interest in Land as against ITusband's Ortditors.-Where a
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wife has an equitable interest in land conveyed to he" h'ishand. by
reason of her having paid a part of the purchase-money, -uch interest
will be protected, as against her husband's subseq, ent vreditors : Lormore et al. v. C mpbell et aL, 60 Barb.
Evience of 1tusband against W t .- In an action aainst husband
and wife, brought by judgment creditors of the husband, to set aside
conveyances made by the defendants, as fraindulent, the examination of
the husband, taken in supplementary proceedings against him, instituted
by another creditor, is legitimate evidence so far as it affects the husband: -N.
But neither the testimony, the acts. nor the declarations of the husband can be used as legal evidence to implicate the wife. or to fix her
conduct as fraudulent, or to divest her of her estate. And if such testiniony is given before a referee, it is his duty, upon the motion of the
wife, -to strike it out, if he does not intend to consider it evidence
against her: Id.
INJUNCTION.

See Equity.

INSURANCE.

Title in, Insured.-A policy of insurance, together with the application therefor, is prinf facie evidence of the title of the insured, to the
property embraced in the policy: Kansas Insurance Co. v. Ber y, 7
Kans.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
See Entry; Estoppel.
MORTGAGE.

Conditional Sale-iliaciner--Fixture.-Wherea person sells machinery under a condition that it shall remain the property of the vendor
until the price is paid, but it is of such character that when it is put in
its place in a mill it would pass under a mortgage of the real estate,
and the vendor had reason to suppose it woul d be. and it was so placed,
before it was paid for: held, that the equity of a subsequent mortgagee,
without notice of the vendor's claim and in reliance upon the vendee's
title being absolute, is paramount to that of the conditional vendor:
Davenport v. Shants, 43 Vt.
But for machinery so sold and delivered, and being in the yard of the
mill but not actually placed in the mill at the time of the execution of
the mortgage;but put in afterwards, the right of the conditional vendor
is paramount, to that of the mortgagee. But the mortgagee would hold
it as against the mortgagor: hi.
.Machinery consisting of a circular saw-mill and saw, belts to drive
.the saw, waterwheel-gears, shaft and box to the same, and drum flanges,
all put in its place in a saw-mill, pass under a mortgage of the real
estate, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee : id.
NUISANCE.
Obstruction ef a llighwuy- WIut constiuates Speial Darnage.-The
obstruction of' a highway is a common nuisance and being a wrong of a
public nature, the remedy is by indictment; it is not in itself a ground
of civil action by an individual, unless he ias suffered fr in it some

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

spe6ial and particular damage, different not merely in degree, but different in kind from that experienced in common with other citizens. In
such case the actual damage constitutes the gist of the action, and must
be averred and proved: Houck v. Wachter, 84 Md.
The mere fact that, by reason of the obstruction, the plaintiff was
obliged to travel a longer and more circuitous route, ip not such special
damage as to entitle him to maintain an action: Id.
Though the plaintiff may suffer more inconvenience than others from
the obstruction, by reason of his proximity to the highway, that will
not entitle him to maintain an action: Id.
The rules of law allowing such actions ought not to be extended: Id.
PARENT AND CHILD.

Obligation to support Minor CMldd.-A parent is under no legal obligation, independent of statutory law, to maintain his minor child:
Kelley v. Davis, 49 N. H.
The Statute applies only to the case of the reimbursement of towns.
for the support of paupers: Id.
A parent cannot be charged for necessaries furnished by a stranger
to his minor child, except upon the promise of the parent, express or
implied, to pay for them: Id.
Such promise is not to be implied from an omission of duty resting
in moral obligation merely: Id.
The law will not imply a promise, against the party's express declaration, except in the case where a positive legal duty is imposed on the
party making the negative declaration: Id.
PARTNERSHIP.

Secret-what is meant by.-= secret partnership is where the existence of certain persons as partners is not avowed or made known to the
public by any of the partners: Deering et al. v. Flanders,49 N. H.
Where all the partners are publicly made known, whether it be by
one or all the partners, it is no longer a secret partnership: for this is
generally used in contradistinction to notorious and open partnership.
And it makes no difference in this particular, whether the business of
the firm be carried on in the name of one person only, or of him and
company: Id.
Where business is thus transacted by A. & B., under the firm of A.
& Co., B. cannot be considered as a dormant partner; and if he retires
from the firm, he is bound to give notice of his retiremgnt, or else he
will remain liable upon contracts subsequently made in the name of the
firm: Id.
"Asto the public, such notice need not be actual; it may be constructive and may be implied from circumstances; but a person accustomed
to deal with the firm will hold a retiring partner for debts subsequently
contracted in the name of the firm, unless such person had actual knowledge of the retirement, or was put upon inquiry: Id.
RAIROAD.

Right of Conductor to put off a Passengerrefusing to pay FareAgency -M. on the 1st of May, purchased a through ticket from N.
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Y. to B. over the P., W., & B. R. R., and on that day took the through
train. The conductor of the train took up the ticket and gave M. a
"tconductor's check," with the words "good for this day and train only."
and with the numerals 5 and 1, showing the month and day, punched
out of the "check." M., desiring to leave the train, at a way station,
inquired of some one at the window of the company's ticket office at the
station, if the " check " would take him to BI on another train and day,
and was told that it "was good till taken up." On the 6h of May,
M. entered another train going to B., and, being called upon for his
ticket, offered the "chieck."
The conductor refused to receive the
"check." and 31. having refused to pay fare, the train was stopped at a
point intermediate between two stations, and by direction of the conductor, M. left the train. Held: Ist. That M. had no right to leave the
train at the way station, and afterwards to enter another train and proceed to his original point of destination without procuring another
ticket, or paying his fare. 2d. That on the refusal of M. to pay his
fare, the conductor had the right to put him off the train, using no more
force than was necessary to effect his removal, and was under no obligation to put him off at a station. 3d. That even if the person, by whom
M. was told that the "check" was good until taken up, was an agent of
the company, the presumption is, that a ticket agent at a way-station
has no authority to change or modify contracts between the company
and through passengers, and the onus of rebutting this presumption
rested on M. : McClure v. P. W. and B. R. Co., 34 d.
RECORD.
SALE.

See Equity,.
See Jlfortgage.

SHERIFF'S RETURN.

Evidence to contradict.-The general rule is, that as between parties
to an action the return of the sheriff is conclusive, but this rule is not
to be carried so far in cases of original process as to preclude an inquiry into the facts on which jurisdiction depends; and when the
return of the sheriff is that a copy of the summons was left at the residence of the defendant, the court may hear and determine whether the
place where the copy was left was at the time the residence of the
defendant: Bond v. Wilson, 7 Kans.
TENDER.

See Accord.

TRESPASS.

By adjoining Owner to make .PartitionFence.-Although it is a general rule that where a party is the owner of personal property which is
upon the land of another, the former cannot commit a trespass by entering and taking it away, yet the rule does not apply to that entry of a
party which is necessary to enable him to make a partition fence between
him and an adjoining owner: Carpenterv. Halseyj, 60 Barb.
The law compels each owner to make his portion; and this carries
with it.
the right to such necessary occupation for the time being, as is
required to comply with such legal duty: Id.

